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Introduction
I comment on the project of promoting heightened corporate responsibility in the
area of human rights from the perspective of a scholar of corporate and securities
2law and, merely, a novice in the field of human rights law. The disparity itself
sheds light on the difficulty of the project embraced in the United Nations' Human
Rights Council's reports on business and human rights.3 To succeed, the project
must unite professionals from many different areas and viewpoints, including
business leaders, heads of nongovernmental organizations, politicians
(governments), human rights activists, lawyers and academics. And in the latter
category are scholars of international law, human rights, labor law, environmental
law and corporate and securities law. These "factions" come to the enterprise with
remarkably different objectives, incentives, professional training and ways of
viewing in the world. John Ruggie, as the Special Representative to the Secretary
General ("SRSG") on Business and Human Rights (reporting to the Human Rights
Counsel) would have a daunting task before him were it only to achieve some of
1 Professor of Law, New York Law School; Director Center on Business Law & Policy. This article is dedicated to my
mother Barbara Reider Stevelman, who even in her seventies, is the most intellectually curious person I know; and
to my father, who in his forty years as a physician, cared for everyone with equal dignity.
2 My only previous writing in the field is Faith Stevelman, Globalization and Corporate Social Responsibility... NYLS L
Rev 2009
For citations to any of the "famous" projects/working papers in the area and the institutions themselves: these
can easily be culled out of Larry Cata Backer's paper, which lists them comprehensively in his footnotes.
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consensus on businesses' roles and responsibilities in these area. To go beyond, to
endeavor to establish and operationalize a framework for promoting businesses'
attentiveness to human rights compliance, illuminates the project's daring. If the
stakes were not so high, the enterprise would seem foolhardy.
I cannot speak of the schism that exists between senior business leaders and human
rights activists first hand.4 But it isn't difficult to imagine the flash points in such
conversations. Although the SRSG consultation I attended (which focused on the
problem of remedies) gave me a feeling for many of the different viewpoints and
actors which have had input into the reports (from 2005 to 2009)5; my own
professional space is the academy. And within this academic community, for
example, business law scholars and the vanguard academics in human rights law
rarely cross paths.6 These are distinct scholarly communities separated, with rare
exception, by deep intellectual and methodologic schisms. Put most simply, for the
past few decades, business law scholars have been concerned principally with
streamlining law to facilitate optimal market transacting. As scholars, they have
mostly lived with the luxury (or fallacy) of taking basic law and order for granted.
(Is it really true that Alan Greenspan actually questioned the need for meaningful
legal prohibitions on fraud?8)
Human rights internationalists, to the contrary, have been deeply invested in
creating some viable tissue of global ordering in law. In international human rights
law, the opposite of law is disorder and violence. Hobbes' "nasty, brutish and
short" is a reality immediately around the corner.9 In corporate and securities law,
in contrast, the counter-factual of law has been construed as "efficiency," - or even
4 Remarkably, the Ruggie information gathering process has revealed widespread concern for human rights
compliance among business leaders, as exemplified by [.... see examples he provides in 2008 report]
I attended the consultation in Boston in fall 2008 (sponsored by the Kennedy School of Government and Oxfam)
that addressed remedies and their appropriate for a.
Scholars in international and human rights law have moved into the economic realm; business law scholars have
been slower to move in the other direction. For an example of the former, see e.g. Robert Howse & Ruti Teitel,
Beyond the Divide: The Covenant on Economic, Society .& Cultural Rights & the World Trade Organization,
n For one of the seminal treatments of this line of thinking see Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Economic
structure of Corporate Law (19.In a fascinating story first printed in Stanford Magazine, former head of the Commodity. Futures Trading
Commission Brooksley E. Born recounts her 1996 lunch with Alan Greenspan during which he told her
"Well, you probably will always believe there should be laws against fraud, and I don't think there is any need for a
law against fraud," she recalls. Greenspan, Born says, believed the market would take care of itself.
For an academic treatment of how the project of market development may often, unwittingly, spark greater
ethnic or national division see Amy Chua, World on Fire and, for a more journalistic account, Naomi Klein, The
Schock Doctrine.
2
"liberty," from a Lockean, market neo-liberal viewpoint.10 As a result, one's
evaluation of John Ruggie's "Protect, Respect, Remedy" framework, as detailed in
his 2008 report to the Human Rights Council, looks very different depending on
which of these camps it's viewed from, whether the business/markets/efficiency
side or the activist/governance/pro-human rights.
To restate from above, the basic working premise outlined in the 2008 Ruggie
report is that states have a duty to protect their citizens from human rights abuses;
businesses have a duty to respect human rights; and they both can work jointly to
establish a variety of remedial frameworks to deal with situations where human
rights abuses by business are alleged. Given the belatedness and contingency of
modem human rights law, Ruggie's framework is beyond doubt innovative and.
brave. 0 nly if we naively anticipated an economically and politically stable,
culturally simpatico, "flat-world" of economic transacting might we dismiss the
importance of what is being attempted and advanced therein. (Let us not forget that
the word "genocide" was coined only in 1943 by Raphael Lemkin, a Polish lawyer
and linguist of Jewish descent who narrowly escaped the Holocaust in Europe, but
lost 49 relatives therein.11)
For a dozen years after the fall of the Berlin wall, in that one super-power, "end of
history" world, such a self-actualizing, relatively stable, global marketplace was
imaginable (and imagined). 12 But surely it no longer can be. Russia's slide into
plutocracy provides one cautionary tale of what goes wrong with too little law.13
The festering problematics of the Washington consensus in the southern
hemisphere provide another.' 4 China presents its own unique conundrum. The rise
of radical Islam and the attacks of September 11 provide yet another challenge to
the west's liberal, democratic, capitalist tradition and its espoused goals." As
Robert Gilpin's writing illuminates, the study of globalization and global economic
10 Neo-liberalism is a controversial and loaded term but most simply it implies a reduction in state control to free
up (even) market actors to seek their own individual good, in economic terms, as a form of freedom. For a critical
reading of the neo-liberal tradition and a contemplation of its plausible impact on the global financial crisis see e.g.
The Revenge of the Market on the Rentiers.: Why Neo-Liberal Reports of the End of History Turned Out to Be
Premature, Jose Gabriel Palma, Univ of Cambridge, available on SSRN
11 For discussion of Lemkin's work and his legacy in the development of international laws against atrocities see
e.g. David Luban, "A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity," 29 Yale J. Int'l L. 85 (2004).
12 cite to first Hansmann & Krakmann article "The End of History for Corporate Law" and then their redo in Iowa
Law Review; see also Lea Brilmayer, "American Hegemony: Political Morality in a One Superpower World, Yale
Univ Press (1996).
1s For a superb treatment of the reasons (securities) law matters and how, see Robert Ahdieh, Making Markets:
Network Effects & the Role of Law in the Creation of Strong Securities Markets, 76 S. Cal. L. Rev. 277 (2003).
14 There is a vast literature on the shorfalls of globalization, see inter alia, Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its
Discontents, ... Saskia Sassen, Globalization
15For a treatment of this issue see Faith Stevelman Kahn, Bombing Markets Subverting the Rule of Law: Enron
Financial Fraud and September 11th 2001 Tulane Law Review
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effects cannot be divorced from the study of international politics and regional
conflicts. 16
Just so, both Ruggie and Backer acknowledge that markets live in larger
institutional structures: social, legal and political; and cannot operate apart from
them. Given the gaps in governance created by the rapid pace of globalized
commerce and finance, there is a clear need to develop new hard and soft law
structures to address the potential conflicts between businesses and human rights.
Both market transacting and social transacting, ultimately, will come undone
without the rule of law.17 The list of failed states and failed markets enumerated
above, as well as the recent global financial crisis, are exemplars of this truth. Seen
fundamentally, then, law is not the enemy of the market, but rather its complement.
As Ruggie remarks, businesses will not necessarily prosper where governments
comprehensively tolerate legal vacuums and pursue deregulation. Without
regulation and enforcement, businesses have less choice to pursue both profit and
"added capacity" -- in the workforce, in consumer relations, in attracting
conscientious investment, in good public relations and in eschewing corruption and
fraud. In legal vacuums, all they can attend to is not being losers in the resulting
race to the bottom.
So globalization is proceeding -- but it doesn't look quite like the WTO might have
imagined, or the academic vanguard proposed. The limits of sovereignty have not
given rise to a world of low friction, reliably smooth, self-perpetuating market
transacting. Instead we observe a rough and tumble of realpolitik, national and
regional exigency, high stakes-high risk opaque financial transacting and still
uncertain and mixed economic results. Even leaving aside Iran's nuclear
ambitions, the economic and geopolitical landscape could hardly be more dynamic
and unstable.' 8
Though disagreements about the overall effects of globalization persist, there is
consensus that the contemporary version of globalization is unique; that it's
qualitatively different from earlier waves of globalization.' 9 To be sure, humans
have been globalizers since before they were even human. Recent studies in paleo-
anthropology suggest that Homo Erectus meandered out of Africa behind the
grazing animals foraging through the grassy plains advancing through Asia and
16 Robert Gilpin, International Political Economy, Princeton 2001.
17 Of course the finest treatment of the place of market (economic) institutions within the broader scheme of
social institutions remains Max Weber, Economy and Society.
For example, we see increasingly dramatic signs of climate change across the globe, as exemplified by a rise in.
large scale natural disasters and widespread fatalities; and yet we are at a moment of hope in relation to
Palistinian-Isaeli peace talks.
19 Can cite to Gilpin again. (first several pages)
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Europe. The progress in science, technology, arts and letters, and economic
organization (the shift away from feudalism) that marked the European
Renaissance were spurred by advances in trade and finance. And the Chinese,
famously, were fantastic early traders, as their thousands of years of cultural
achievements display. Yet, modem technology appears to have occasioned a
seismic shift in the phenomenon of globalization; and one that is highly relevant to
the multinational corporations.
The secret, of course, is technology. With global satellites and cheap, pervasive
cell phone service, communications technology has advanced profoundly in the
last thirty years. And with the development of the personal computer and radically
"'micro" micro-processing power, information technology has been transformed.
The transformation in communications and information technology has facilitated
the gathering, integration, synthesis and instant-updating of financial and
operational information vital to corporate and market transacting on a global
*20basis.
Finally, let us not forget that the invention of the modern, multi-national
corporation is itself a 20th century technological leap of enormous moment. Our
minds tend to conflate what is with what was inevitable; but it isn't so. The
modem, highly capitalized, professionally managed, limited liability corporation is
the result of early twentieth century legal transformation. Its story partakes of both
legal invention and legal dis-integration (deregulation). The former is recognizable
in the pervasive acceptance of the corporation as a robustly capable, distinct legal
person invested with an astoundingly broad set of legal rights, including durability
over both time (immortality) and space (national and international recognition).
An example of deregulation is the enactment of broadly enabling corporation codes
which eliminated the bevy of earlier stakeholder regarding proscriptions. The
elimination of most all limits and requirements from these codes encouraged
capital investment in the corporate fornf, and hence a tremendous leap in industrial
infrastructure. 2 1 And the codes' simplicity enabled even nonlawyers to establish
corporations "preloaded" (as a matter of law) with all powers requisite to their
business. If you contrast the laws of personal inheritance, the fragility of trusts and
wills, the complexity even of marrying and divorcing, with the easy formation and
20 For discussion see e.g. Gilpin (first several pages) and also Eric Schmidt, "Truth or Consequences," Forbes
Magazine, August 12, 2010.
21For discussion of the transition from the pattern of legislative chartering and proscriptive regulation of the
corporate form to the far more "deregulatory" pattern of incorporating via simple filings under statutes which
freely grant corporate powers and impose very few restrictions see Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition,
Choice of Forum and Delaware's Stake in Corporate Law...Delaware Journal of Corporate Law (there is a specific
dicsussion of this in the early part of the paper -a s it relates to Delaware's interest in holding onto the firms ch
artered there) and see also Frederick Tung, Internal Affairs Doctrine...
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muscularity of the corporate form, the powerful legal technology that is the modem
corporation comes into view.
My task is to comment on the excellent article of Larry Cata Backer which
provides an account of the "protect, respect, remedy" framework set forth in the
seminal 2008 report by John Ruggie, the Special Representative to the Secretary
General, on Business and Human Rights. 22 Installed in 2005, Ruggie's office has
been extended under the administration of the current secretary general, Ban Ki-
Moon. Ruggie's most recent efforts have been directed at commencing the
operationalization of this framework, which has been vetted world-wide with
governments, lawyers, academics, and human rights advocates. 23 How will
governments, corporations, business associations and rights advocates imagine and
construct the varieties of fora and modes of recourse available to hear rights
grievances? 24
My comments are not intended to be comprehensive. I focus first on Backer's
accomplishments, and then on the remaining features of the 2008 PRR framework
which I find noteworthy. I then turn my analysis to developments in corporate and
securities law which are relevant to this evolving human rights framework. I end
with a contemplation of the complex relationship between legal transformation and
social transformation. Clearly, there is no simple answer to the question of how
cultural and legal transformation evolves and what their interrelationship is. But
Backer is surely correct in his conclusion that the 'protect, respect, remedy'
framework will be influential in the evolving relationship of business and human
rights.
I. Overview: The PRR Framework of the 2008 Report
There were reports prior to 2008,25 and there have been ones since, so why do
commentators focus on the 2008 Report made by John Ruggie, the Special
Representative to the Secretary General of the United Nations on Business &
Human Rights? The answer is that the 2008 Report lays out the core principles of
the foundation for the Human Rights Council's initiative in promoting adherence
to human rights standards by international businesses. The 2008 Report refers to
itself as a "conceptual and policy" framework for business and human rights, and
it's central message is captured in the phrase: "Protect, Respect, Remedy."
2 Add citation to Backer
23 Ruggie so describes in the 2008 report and, also, Fried Frank has produced a memo/survey which describes
further vetting.
24 This was the precise subject of the fall 2008 consultation with the SRSG which I attended, as sponsored by the
Kennedy School of Government in conjunction with Oxfam at the Boston offices of Foley & Hoag.
25
6
As lawyers and others who follow the field know, the Ruggie Reports follow the
spectacular descent into oblivion of the so-called "Norms" (the "UN Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
with Regard to Human Rights). The Norms were released in 2003 and by 2004
they had been roundly rejected. Their failed approach was to enunciate a core set
of international human rights standards that business would be responsible for
addressing in terms of compliance and prevention (i.e. protecting from abuses), in
coordination with the responsibilities assigned to states. Ruggie was one of the
most outspoken detractors from the Norms. The fear was that the list of "core"
business/human rights norms was underinclusive and the assignment of primary
and secondary responsibility amongst states and businesses would yield
unproductive dissension. Hence, in 2005 the UN appointed Professor Ruggie as the
"Special Representative on business and human rights," reporting to the Secretary
General and the Human Rights Council. His five year term was extended for
another five years in 2010.26
The 2008 Report begins with an extensive discussion of states' duty to protect
citizens from human rights violations, whether committed by individuals or
corporations. Along these lines, the Report describes governments' roles in
promoting corporate cultures where respect for human rights will be a salient, core
value. The Report notes states' shortfalls in vertical coherence (where governments
play lip service to firms' duties to respect human rights but fail to implement
efficacious mechanisms of redress) as well as horizontal coherence (where states
facilitate a disconnect between the agencies tasked with promoting human rights,
and other governmental bodies empowered to advance commercial and investment
goals). Finally, the tremendously important role of business investment treaties is
mentioned. These treaties all too often stymie host governments from enacting new
regulations to raise social and environmental standards in the country during the
pendency of an ongoing development project (perhaps over several decades). Far
too little attention has been brought to this controversial subject within mainstream
legal academia, but it is not a central focus of the Ruggie project.2 7
Yet there is no ambiguity surrounding the fact that the central question in the
report is how to promote human rights compliance by businesses - and the role of
governments, businesses, civil society advocates and international organizations in
26 For a superb overview of the United Nations Human Rights treaties dating back decades and leading up to the
Ruggie Reports, see "Global Efforts to Hold Corporations Accountable: Past Efforts and Current Initiatives," 12 The
International Review 16 ( published by New York Law School, 2009).
27 For a sober (i.e. relatively nonpartisan) account of the investment treaty process and structure see Anthea
Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States," 104 A.J.I.L. 179
(2010)
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achieving this goal. According to the 2008 Report, a crucial factor that's been
missing is a coherent "conceptual and policy" framework, and this is where the
Protect-Respect-Remedy constellation is intended to make a meaningful
contribution.
Within the 2008 Report, corporations' duty to respect human rights is captured in
the phrase of "do no harm." Yet it is more than a passive duty. Rather, the report
describes the many intra-corporate initiatives which would add up to a meaningful
commitment to avoid complicity in human rights abuses. Here again, Ruggie
invokes the notion of "corporate culture," which encompasses leadership from the
top, systematic compliance codes, the dissemination of such codes of conduct
throughout each level of the organization, and the creation of internal mechanisms
for reporting and addressing grievances. As part of this effort, corporations are
advised to undertake impact assessments before the undertake various projects, and
to conduct extensive, ongoing "due diligence" into potential human. rights
problems through the course of their operations. In this way, the report suggests,
corporations can limit the possibility that they will become embroiled in complicity
with human rights abuses, and hence limit the possibility that they. will be held
liable in national courts, nongovernmental fora and in the court of public opinion.
A further achievement of the report is its reporting on the sum of many different
kinds of human rights initiatives and their varied innovations. First of all, the 2008
Report clarifies that it itself is a product of an astoundingly comprehensive "due
diligence" process. This process encompassed 14 multi-stakeholder consultations
on five continents; the undertaking of more than two dozen research projects, along
with the assistance of global law firms and other legal experts; the amassing of
1,000 pages of documents and twenty 'submissions;' and two previous reports to
the Commission on Human Rights and the Human Rights Council.28 And as one
works through the 2008 Report one becomes aware of the accumulation of varied
efforts to promote businesses' conformity with evolving human rights standards;
for example, as enunciated in the Equator Principles, the Paris Principles, a
multitude of multi-stakeholder initiatives including the Kimberly Process, the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the Tripartite Declaration of
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy and the Global
Compact, as well as the sustained efforts of the International Labor Organization.
The point is, there appears to be a growing crescendo of broad-based concern to
promote ethical -conduct by business - through initiatives which are not anti-
28 This is described in the Report at #4, p. 3. According to footnote #1, therein, "All documentation produced by
and for the mandate is posted on the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre's website:
http://www.business-humanrights.org/Gettingstarted/UNSpecialRepresentative."
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business or anti-market, but rather see the future of strong markets and strong
businesses being sustained only within broad-based frameworks of values and
efficacious remedial mechanisms.
And on the issue of remedies, the 2008 Report does a superb job of surveying the
strengths and weakenesses of the entire spectrum of fora and approaches: from
state based tribunals, to international tribunals, to nonstate tribunals, to arbitration
councils established by consortium of businesses across various industries. The
Reports statements about the limits of redress available for corporations' host-state
rights violations in home state courts is well taken. Travel and litigation costs,
jurisdictional and statute of limitations blocks, evidentiary problems, and even
defenses based on 'state interests' (including the recent 'state secrets' defense used
to a Boeing subsidiary's advantage in federal court) will commonly mean that the
grievance cannot effectively be pursued in the corporation's home state. And all
too often the host state will lack the capacity to provide acceptable redress. Perhaps
the most exciting new idea in the report in the area of remedies, is the
establishment of an international "ombudsman," who could consider and
recommend appropriate vehicles and modes of redress in response to seemingly
valid complaints of human rights abuses by business.
As its conclusion makes clear, the 2008 Report, while a major conceptual and
policy innovation, is only one step in the evolving program to improve businesses'
conscientiousness in regard to human rights. This Report, along with the ones
presented in 2006 and 2007, suggest progress which, as stated therein, "would not
have been conceivable a decade ago." Nevertheless, the success of the project does
not rest on formal, legal change, at least not as a primary, first-order response. The
Reports and the other initiatives they refer to be judged as contingent responses to
a growing and serious international problem. While contingent, their multiplicity
and creativity and purposefulness may cumulatively create the traction to inspire
grass roots change - change in the social expectations which support commerce
and investment. If that occurs, then the necessary legal and regulatory and also
informal mechanisms of accountability will develop accordingly.
II. Comments on Backer's critique of the 2008 Ruggie Report
A. The Importance of History.
The Introduction and first substantive section of Backer's article provides an
historical account of the conceptual and practical background. and evolution of
John Ruggie's reports. We get an account of private sector (voluntary business)
initiatives aimed at fostering human rights compliance, including global reporting
initiatives and the "Guidelines for Multinational Corporations" promulgated by
9
the OECD (Organization for Cooperation and Development). We also learn about
the prior efforts by UN agencies, including the UN Global Compact and the
abandoned UN "Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights. Finally, Backer offers
an account of Ruggie's annual reports, beginning in 2005.29
Why so much history? In the climate of law and economics, corporate legal
teaching and scholarship has had little need for history. Even securities law is
commonly taught and analyzed from an ahistorical perspective. 30 Human rights
law, it would appear, is different - different because of its contingency,. its optative
nature.. In contrast to (domestic) corporate law in the United States, and securities
law, the extra-sovereign nature of human rights law means that it is an ongoing,
contingent proj ect.3 1  It exists as law in a different way than corporate and
securities law do, and hence its "manufacture" is inherently interesting and
important. In sum, the conceptual and practical "archeological evolution"
underlying Ruggie's 2008 report and PRR framework is a necessary and
worthwhile aspect of its study and Backer's piece accomplishes this clearly and
succinctly.
B. The Premise of Law and the Uncertain Promise of Polycentricity
At the most superficial level we consider "law" to be that which cannot be
disregarded without the risk of state sanction, civil or criminal. But the concept of
law is quite patently broader, more profound and more elusive than this definition
would represent. Law gives authority to concepts and standards which are broadly
(if not comprehensively) endorsed. As social scientist Tom Tyler and others have
illuminated, laws are actualized, mostly, because they are internalized as
legitimate.32 Adherence to law is inspired, mostly, not by the mathematics of risk
and magnitude of sanction but rather by virtue of law's adherence to broadly
shared value and understandings connected to substantive and procedural
justification and legitimation. 33
2 Cite Backer and take any necessary cites to the UN initiatives, the voluntary initiative and the reports from his
footnotes.
A wonderful deviation from this ahistorical focus, which helps to make sense of the broader arc of the securities
laws, is contained in the library and archives of the SEC Historical Society. See Also Joel Seligman, The
Transformation of Wall Street: A History of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
3See Ruti Teitel, Humanity's Law, Oxford University press (forthcoming)
n See Tom Tyler, Procedural Justice
33 For a fascinating analysis of the theoretical bases for recognition of private law beyond sovereign borders see
Florian RodI, On the Legitimatory Problem of Private Law "Beyond the State" 56 Am. J. Comp. L. 743 (2008).
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Human rights law is challenged at both ends of the spectrum. The limits of
sovereignty pose a functional problem in terms of sanction. 34 And value pluralism
poses a challenge in terms of the commonality of understandings necessary for
internalization and voluntary adherence. Of course, this challenge is magnified
when the "laws" are addressed to large, faceless bureaucracies which, even if we
could find them, and decipher their voices, would speak in different tongues.
These challenges - enforceability and value pluralism -- are part of why Ruggie's
business and human rights project resolved itself around the concept of businesses'
"respecting" human rights, instead of endorsing affirmative duties for businesses'
advancing human rights, as had been true in the subsequently abandoned "Norms."
The "respect" framework, plainly, is a looser, more conceptually derivative
concept, and one which can evolve through soft law mechanisms -- at least whilst
it matures. In contrast, the duty (attributed to states) to protect citizens against
human rights abuses needs a harder legal edge.35
In a very real sense, then, the Ruggie project of mandating, informally, that
corporations "respect" human rights" is a child of the new governance. 36 And
Backer's commentary on Ruggie's synthesis of hard law with softer rules and
industry voluntarism is illuminating. The synthesis is intellectually exciting, but
also confounding - confounding because the "new governance" movement is itself
a moving target. "New governance" - the synthesis of hard law and softer rules
and norms, means different things to different legal and scholarly communities.
Corporate and securities law have enthusiastically embraced one form of the new
governance in their favoring soft law, self-regulatory approaches to addressing
economic and commercial challenges, but not because of value pluralism or
skepticism regarding potential enforceability.3 7
In corporate law, the expansion of soft law and the new governance has meant, for
example, favoring governance requirements imposed by the stock exchanges and
FINRA -- the Financial Institutions Regulatory Authority, over both federal and
34The problem is illustrated, for example, by the controversy surrounding the legitimacy and authority surrounding
the International Criminal Court - which is still opposed by the United States and other countries.
3s For Ruggie's own discussion of the challenge see John Gerard Ruggie,.Business & Human Rights: The Evolving
International. Agenda, 101 AJ.I.L. 819(2007)
3 cite to articles on The New Governance. e.g. Orly Lobel, Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 89
Minn. L. Rev. 498 (2004). ; Fred Amman; 2010 Wisconsin Law Review Wisconsin Law Review 2010, 2010 Wis. L.
Rev. 673, 21963 words, SYMPOSIUM: NEW GOVERNANCE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW: ARTICLE: THREE
CONCEPTIONS OF LAW: TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM, Dr. Michael Wilkinson;
David Esty, Yale L J Global Administrative Law
3 The project of rethinking self-regulation in the financial industry has, of course, more than begun. See e.g. Saule
Omarova, Rethinking the Future of Self-Regulation in the Financial Industry, _ BROOK. J. INT'L L. _ (forthcoming).
Cite to recent paper by Chris Brummer presented at Columbia forum on Law & Economics; Gillian Hadfield;
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state corporate laws.38 (FINRA is a stand alone "regulatory" body which absorbed
the regulatory functions of the New York Stock Exchange and the National
Association of Securities Dealers.) In this same vein, scholars and industry
participants have favored housing accounting standards-setting in the private
"Financial Accounting Standards Board," and auditing oversight in the quasi-
private, quasi-public (and apparently unconstitutional39) Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board. Even the state courts and especially Delaware's
courts of equity -most nationally influential state courts in corporate law area --
have favored "intra-corporate solutions" like ratification/approval by
subcommittees of "independent" directors over ex post judicial intervention (even
where fiduciary malfeasance has been alleged).40 These are only a few of the
infinite tasks assigned to "self-regulatory," private bodies in the new "soft
governance" world.
Of course, the guiding motive behind this push to self regulation is that it will be
less costly and more flexible, hence conducive to private parties' maximization of
wealth. In short, the guiding motive is "efficiency." Law promulgated by
legislatures (state or federal) or even specialized administrative agencies
(encumbered by notice and comment processes for example) is disfavored. Of
course, private, self regulation looks most attractive in a world of equal
commercial bargaining power, relative equality of information and voice, and few
externalities. Where the opposite conditions pertain, self-regulation may operate
as an alternative mode of regulatory capture (sans the regulation). To be sure, the
experiences of late 2007 through today, as they have rocked the financial services
industry and the real economy, are making government, lawyers and citizens
rethink the self-regulation paradigm. The excesses of self-regulation are being paid
for by those suffering in the real economy (the New York Times just reported that
For the argument that the internationalization of capital has effectuated a system of enhanced exchange-based
financial regulation and regulatory competition, see Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Market for
Securities Laws, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. _ (2008)
See Free Enterprise Fund et al v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, (2009), Supreme Court; for
discussion see Donna Nagy,
The most aggressive of such proposals involves eliminating judicial review of controlling shareholders' freezeout
transactions where there's been majority of the minority shareholder consent and special committee consent. See
e.g. In re Cox Communications (Strine 20_J. For commentary, see e.g. Kenneth B. Davis, Jr. Structural Bias, Special
Litigation Committees, and the Vagaries of Director Independence, 90 Iowa Law Review 1305 (2005).
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one in seven Americans lives in poverty) 41 and by those bemoaning the strictures
of the new "Dodd-Frank" legislation.42
Yet Backer, and clearly Ruggie too, are sanguine about the promise of
polycentricity and the synthesis of hard law, state-based duties to protect and softer
law corporate commitments to respect human rights. (The protect and respect
duties come together in relation to remedies: both states and businesses are
foreseen as having to innovate new kinds and new for a for remediation.) But are
they correct to pause on the soft ground of soft governance? Is the abandonment of
the UN Norms on business and human rights (which might have obtained
mandatory force through the construction of a matrix of binding contracts), a move
in the right direction? Both authors believe it's an improvement, but neither
entirely spells out why.
In fact, I agree with them. The "commitment to respect" framework is a positive
innovation in an imperfect world. It's a commitment that will facilitate
management's. ability to maximize human rights adherence by corporate actors in
conditions of scarcity and uncertainty - which is to say the real world that
businesses face every day. Ruggie nails this when he discusses human rights due
diligence for businesses and how contextually driven it must be. Business'
appropriate attentiveness to avoiding human rights abuses will require an appraisal
of country/regional factors, business-specific practices and the corporation's larger
network of operations, as the 2008 report states.43 In such a dynamic environment,
the hands-on executives, on their own or in conjunction with their lawyers and
board committees, will need to make a fact specific analyses of priorities along the
spectrum of "do no harm." Clearly, this is not the kind of mandate that could
readily be specified ex ante, at least not with any meaningful precision. I'd say that
the key is to encourage, to condition and incentivize business leaders to include the
downside of corporate human rights abuses as part of their business judgment,
rather than to remove or downsize the scope of that judgment through harder, more
intrusive forms of human rights law-making.4
41 The ranks of the working-age poor climbed to the highest level since the 1960s as the recession threw millions of
people out of work last year, leaving one in seven Americans in poverty. The overall poverty rate climbed to 14.3
percent or 43.6 million people the Census Bureau said Thursday in its annual report on the economic well-being of
U.S. households. [citation to census report, week of September 17 'h
42 add official cite to Dodd Frank
43 cite to disc. of Due Diligence in the report
4 There's little doubt that American corporate law affords corporate directors substantial leeway to avoid the
public and corporate harms arising from human rights abuses. This discretionary space exists within the construct
of "the business judgment rule." For a recent review of the grounds of board primacy (from the perspective of
efficiency or civil society theory) see Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY AND THE
CURIOUS TURN TOWARD BOARD PRIMACY 51 William & Mary Law Review 2071 (2010),
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And yet I think that Backer overstates the character of Ruggie's legal framework
with his almost Ovidian account of legal morphogenesis (the synthesis of hard and
soft law and social norms and standards into the "polycentric" business and human
rights framework). As I will describe below, a curious but powerful feature of
Ruggie's success is the humility of his PRR framework, as reflected in his relative
avoidance of novel concepts and grandiose "internationalist" rhetoric. He proposes
merely a slight expansion, a customization of the current corporate governance
framework, as it takes into account many systems of internal controls requisite to
* 45compliance and reporting.
C. Due Diligence and the Problem of Complicity
In fleshing out his duty to respect Ruggie invokes the commonly used conceit of
"corporate due diligence." 46  As described in the report, and by analogy to the
overall process of corporate due diligence, the human rights due diligence process
would encompass gathering information of many kinds (especially about apparent
rights-based "risks" and the rights-compliance conduct of stakeholders, affiliates
and third parties),creating a statement of purpose, setting goals and standards and
integrating the message throughout the organization.4 1 In addition, of course, it
would be essential to measure and systematically revisit compliance goals.
Corporations do this kind of assessment in many areas, of course. The
communications and technology revolutions of these decades have transformed
corporations' ability to just these kinds of assessments, and influenced corporate
law to prescribe them. 48 The challenge of remaining profitable in a condition of
global competition, one would think, would demand a nearly constant refinement
of the firm's systems and practices for nearly real time accounting for revenues,
resources and risks, etc.49
Corporate lawyers do "due diligence" for their business clients prior to a variety of
transactions and events. Due diligence is required prior to an offering of securities
45 For the argument that accurate and comprehensive internal reporting, up to the offices of senior management,
the board and shareholders, as required, is the most vital component of corporate fiduciary duty see Faith
Stevelman Kahn, Transparency and Accountability: Rethinking the Relationship of Corporate Fiduciary Duty and
Corporate Disclosure, U Ga Law Review 2000.
For a famous account of corporate due diligence in relation to corporate securities offering materials see Escott
v Barchriss.
4747 For an early statement of the comprehensive importance of internal corporate information gathering and
reporting systems see The Treadway Report, 1987; and for commentary on its gradual acceptance into the
corporate governance framework see Melvin-A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and Internal Controls...
For the landmark instance see In re Caremark, Delaware Court of Chancery 1996, Chancellor Allen.
Many corporate commentators have suggested that we are on the verge of moving to a system of real time
corporate disclosure, instead of the system of periodic reporting with updating on Form 8-K or as necessary to
obviate selective disclosure (as required by Reg FD). But the law has not moved that far yet.
14
and the preparation of other public filings, so that the public statements match the
actual condition of the firm - this is an outgrowth of the anti-fraud provisions of
the securities laws.50 Due diligence is required in the context of mergers and
acquisitions, so that representations can be made and conditions agreed to, and so
that valuations can be arrived to facilitate bargaining. The firm's lawyers work
hand in hand with a variety of corporate offices to fulfill these requirements and
goals.
But the understanding of due diligence that Ruggie invokes is a more recent one
having to do with improvements in internal controls designed to bring such
corporate information gathering to a far more comprehensive, timely and accurate
level. The emphasis on internal control systems evident in Sarbanes Oxley (there it
relates principally to financial reporting) was both an outgrowth and exemplar of
what had been an ongoing, comprehensive trend in corporate best practices. This
upward trend in favor of internal corporate transparency reflects decades of
evolution, harkening back to the original Treadway Report of 1987,' if not the
books and records provisions included by Congress in the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, about a decade earlier.52
The major problem with Ruggie's human rights due diligence idea is not, in fact,
it's feasibility.. Nor its cost, because if there is a palpable danger of serious
corporate complicity in human rights abuses, given the potential public relations
and litigation costs, firms will have a meaningful financial incentive to invest in
due diligence and compliance efforts to avoid them (assuming the firm is well run
and its agents have nothing to gain personally from the abuses). Rather, the
problem with the due diligence concept endorsed in the 2008 report is corporate
incentive and the "law of unintended consequences." A smart, reasonable, well
constructed system of due diligence and human rights risk assessment should help
a corporation avoid serious human rights abuses - in many, though surely not in
all, cases. On the positive side, if such abuses occur despite a well-conceived,
conscientious human rights compliance program,. there is a solid platform for
corporations to avoid legal liability and lessen public opprobrium.
The problem is that sporadic due diligence efforts and poorly run compliance
programs might be worse than nothing. Ruggie is .silent about this possibility, but
Backer notes it. It's a dicey, real world problem for a firm contemplating
so Cite again to Escott v Barchris. Note, too, that due diligence is becoming more complicated and less effective in a
"shelf offering" world. See e.g. WorldCom litigation against directors. And see the new disclosure requirements for
securitizations as shelf offerings under Dodd Frank.
s1 repeat cite to Treadway from above
52 provide official citation to Section 13b)(..) ( _ of the Securities Exchange Act -the books and records provisions
of the FCPA...
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establishing human rights compliance and due diligence programs. Damned if you
don't do it, damaged if you do it poorly?
Furthermore, as both Ruggie and Backer acknowledge, complicity is itself a dicey
and potentially sweeping concept and terminology. The scope of legal complicity
in human rights abuses would track, in most cases, the scienter and causality
concepts inherent in corporate criminal law (and in slightly weaker form, corporate
securities law fraud provisions). Given this high bar, proving corporate complicity
in human rights abuses in a court of law would be extremely difficult, except in
egregious cases. The twenty six years that plaintiffs spent pursuing a remedy
against Union Carbide on account of the tragedy in Bhopal, and the limited success
of the result, stand as illustration.5 3 The same is true of the criminal trial against
W.R. Grace employees for poisoning the population of Libby Montana through
toxic asbestos exposure. Despite a hard-driving federal prosecution team that
pressed forward for close to a decade, not one of the executives who had been in
charge of decades of egregious asbestos leaks from a local refinery owned and
operated by W.R. Grace was held criminally liable. 54
But legal complicity is not all that's at stake, of course. Social opprobrium, and
consumer and investor backlash aren't constrained by the civil rights protections
and other structures which stifle prosecutors. In a world where there is growing
popular concern about human rights compliance and growing technological
capacity to post any form of "smoking gun" evidence to the web, the prospect of
more aggressive human rights due diligence will appear as a two-edged sword.
Consumers, employers, investors and governments will demand or at least expect
it; corporations will become more accustomed to their commitments if not duties to
do it. But they will be anxious and conflicted about this responsibility to "protect"
through appropriate, ongoing due diligence and compliance programs. Bottom line:
corporations are well aware that they have the potential to incriminate as well as
exonerate themselves in these efforts. Information possessed internally in
electronic form, even accessible to electronic transmission - which is to say almost
anything -- readily becomes information in the public domain. 5 5 On this basis,
conclusion that "companies can avoid complicity" in human rights abuses through
appropriate due diligence appears naYve.
53 In June 2010, seven ex-employees, including the former UCIL chairman, were convicted in Bhopal of causing
death by negligence and sentenced to two years imprisonment and a fine of about $2,000 each, the maximum
punishment allowed by law. An eighth former employee was also convicted but died before judgment was passed.
Lydia Polygreen & Hari Kumar, "8 Former Executives Guilty in '84 Bhopal Chemical Leak, NY Times, June 7, 2010
54 For reference to an extensive archive of- trial related materials and commentary see
http://www.asbestosnetwork.com/news/nw_060209_wr_grace.htm
The phenomenon is recently addressed by Google's CEO. See Eric Schmidt, "Truth of Consequences,"
Forbes
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D. States, Firms and Civil Society
The 2008 report acknowledges the very different structure and incentives that
operate in business corporations versus states. As stated therein: "Corporations are
economic organizations, not democratic public interest institutions. As such, their
responsibilities cannot and should not mirror the duties of states." Furthermore,
Ruggie's framework is definitive in attributing to states, and only states, the
responsibility for protecting citizens against human rights abuses, whether by
individuals or by enterprises or institutions. In sum, although the report presents
itself as a "conceptual. and policy framework" for advancing human rights
compliance by business, it quite simply avoids any pronouncements about the
relationship of states to corporations or the "place" of corporations in a globalized
structure usually analyzed in terms of states and (natural persons as) citizens.
To elaborate, there are no references to civil society theory. There are no
references to social contract theory. There are no references to democratic theory.
Nor, even, i s there mention of corporate "legal personhood." Nevertheless, in
reading the report, we don't initially notice these omissions. The report gains
greater force and coherence by eschewing theory and presenting a meaningfully
practical account of how corporate culture might be shaped (by states and
corporations themselves) to actualize greater human rights compliance.
Globalization, according to the report - the enhanced scope and scale of corporate
operations in conjunction with limits on legal compliance arising from law's
historic "stickiness" to national boundaries - is the "causal" explanation for
Ruggie's mandate to address and clarify the necessity of corporations'
commitments to the human rights agenda, as described in the report.
And yet Backer finds grounds for identifying a larger conceptual framework: one
synthesizing legal obligations and social norms into a coherent conceptual
framework - an elaborate, "multi-level system of polycentric governance." As he
describes it, the "three pillar framework acknowledges the reality of nonstate
governance systems centered on the regulatory community of economic actors."
Elsewhere he states that the report "builds a system [of corporate commitments]
that is not tied to the state... but rather grounded in social legitimacy and what
might be understood as disciplinary and culturally embedded techniques."
Here I am skeptical. Indeed, the Ruggie reports are remarkable for the scope of
what they achieve while eschewing any theorizing about where the state "fits" into
a[ny] model of political or social theory. The most obvious one, the one that would
fit most easily into the report's PRR framework, would be a theory of corporate
personalty. That is, since corporate law (and even more robustly, the U.S.
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Constitution, after the speech-rights decision rendered by the Supreme Court in
Citizens' United case 56) allows for a robust construct of the corporation-as-person,
why does Ruggie assiduously avoid it? Isn't it so that all persons have a duty to
respect human rights, and that the state has a duty to protect its citizens from
human rights abuse by any person? Ruggie acknowledges the latter, but not the
former. One would assume there was something about the concept of legal
personalty that was found insufficient or otherwise unsatisfactory. Why, then, the
decision "not to go there?"
Pehaps it's this: all human persons exist in a place and have a certain, specified
citizenship. Real persons do not escape the bounds of sovereignty, except in
extraordinary cases (especially where extradition is not an option). But
corporations - however we "construct" them as persons-- certainly can transcend
geographic and political boundaries, because of their intangible, legal nature. The
globalization problem - the limits of state sovereignty and the contingent nature of
international law - forces the issue of human rights compliance to the fore. For this
reason, the corporate personalty answer/approach does nothing to help resolve the
practical and even theoretic problems posed by the limits of sovereignty and the
scope of multinational business enterprises.
Nevertheless, it's worth noting that the robustness of the corporate person was not
always universally accepted. As Professor Tung and other scholars (including
myself) have noted, a vestigial feature of the corporations as "creatures of state
law" notion was that it wasn't clear, late in the 19t and early in the 20t century,
that the full complement of legal rights and privileges afforded a corporation by its
chartering state, would be respected by a court (and plaintiffs' bar) in a foreign
57jurisdiction. Nor should this be understood as a foreign state's trampling on an
established rule of law. The point is - the foreign state was enforcing the law (as
pressed by a plaintiff) as it construed the law to be. The concept of corporate
personalty (the inviolability of a corporation's rights to its property, self direction,
power to sue, and the limited liability of.its shareholders etc.) is in the end a legal
tautology; it is true only because it is accepted by states and courts as being true.
And it would appear that is accepted by states and courts as being true for a
fundamentally economic purpose, i.e. to encourage capital formation and economic
development via the corporate form. So it's simply not clear that there is any
s6 Add citation to Citizens United, S CT 2010. For a landmark case establishing the "separate" legal personhood of a
corporation see Dartmouth College v. Woodward 17 U.S. [4Wheat] 518 (1819).
Cite to [Fred Tung, Corporate Internal affairs doctrine: it's in the first dozen pages or so; and F Stevelman,
Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum and Delaware's Stake in Corporate Law 2009 (it's in the discussion of the
early version of the internal affairs doctrine).
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political or social theory that has evolved to keep pace with the legal/conceptual/
technological development of the modem corporation.
Backer "solves" the theoretical problem or void in the 2008 Report by pointing to
what he believes is recognition of an internationally meaningful framework of
social legitimacy. I have a few problems with that. First, I am not sure that the
reports suggest there is anything close to consensus in the area of business and
human rights. Second, I am pretty sure there isn't any such global consensus about
human rights at present (perhaps with the exception of corporate complicity in
torture - but even that is not uncomplicated, on account of the so-called "war on
terror").58
Thirdly, as a general matter, I remain confused about the relationship and
complementary development of social norms and law (whether "soft" or "hard").
Which is the cart and which is the horse, or does it change depending on the
context? It would seem that there are times that law gets out just in front of where
the majoritarian consensus is; and at other times, the foundations of social change
are clear, and the law catches up. How this will play out in the business and human
rights arena remains a subject for further study.
E. What is "Law?"
A central preoccupation of the Law and Society movement is answering the
question: "What fits within the category of 'law' and why? And how is 'law'
constituted?" For Law and Society scholars (such as my colleague, Frank
Munger59) the question is an opportunity to bring to bear the richness of other
social sciences on the study of law and law making. More prosaically, for anyone
who has personally dealt with the courts or other legal authorities (which is to say
everyone at some point, even if only on a relatively trivial level), the question is
patently of enormous moment. Who gets to decide what is and is not "law," in an
authoritative manner (and why) matters immensely.
Clearly this is a central issue for the study of human rights "law" too. But the
question is not addressed in the Ruggie framework or reports, which, again, take a
wisely pragmatic approach to promoting human rights compliance and reducing
abuses by business. Such theoretical questions ("What is Law?" "Where does
s8 Insert footnote to recent Jeppeson case where Obama administration successfully defeated plaintiffs allegations
of torture against US Government AND BOEING SUBSIDIARY via a state's secrets defense...nb the case may be
appealed. The United States Supreme Court has accepted certiori to hear the case in the coming term.
s9 See e.g. Frank Munger, Globalization, Investing in Law, and the Careers of Lawyers for Social Causes: Taking on
Rights in Thailand, 53 NYLS L. Rev. 745 (2009/10); David Engel and Frank Munger, Rights of Inclusion: Law and
Identity in the Life Stories of Americans with Disabilities (Chicago 2003) (Analyzing beliefs about what the law is
and how those beliefs influence everyday action).
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business "fit" into the structure of the state/society that recognizes governmental
authority and individual rights?") may be unnecessary to achieving the goal. A
different, more sweeping, prescriptive and conceptually enriched approach (as was
evident in the Norms) would likely incite more controversy than it would warrant,
given that progressive change "on the ground" is the focus of the reports and UN
intiative.
More troubling however, is Backer's - and perhaps the entire new governance
movement's - comfort with the "potpourri" notion of law. In this perspective there
are many compelling, perhaps equally authoritative versions of law (hard and soft,
national, international, privately generated etc.). Backer endorses the view, and yet
he himself notes not only its slipperiness (the idea that "law" is everywhere, and
constantly in dynamic process); but also the potentially frightening implications of
just such an all-inclusive (unprincipled?), liberal, approach to law.
Of course, that question - what constitutes "law" and why -- is far too large to
address, a fortiori resolve in my remarks here. But it clearly is a formative,
inexorable challenge to the field of human rights "law." Furthermore, as mentioned
above, the drive for efficiency has catalyzed the issue - i.e. the comparative
advantage - of laws, rules and private standards. In a world of globalized
transacting, Backer's "polycentricity" is likely both apt and inevitable, but that
doesn't make it less intellectually and pragmatically unsettling. Comprehensive
relativism is troubling as a mode of achieving coherence. And something precious,
likely, is lost in the enterprise of "all is law; law is all." Like the limits of
liberalism, such easy pluralism is morally, intellectually and institutionally
unsatisfying and unstable.
III. Thoughts on the "Protect, Respect, Remedy" Framework of the 2008 Report
A. The State's Role in Shaping Corporate Culture
The 2008 R eport states "Governments are uniquely placed to foster corporate
cultures in which respecting rights is an integral part of doing business." To a
corporate law scholar the statement is at once self-evident and, oddly, shocking.
It's self-evident in the sense that governments clearly can tax and. regulate and
sanction or subsidize and reward all kinds of behavior by corporations. Obviously,
there's nothing novel in that idea. Plainly, too, in cumulative effect, how the
government chooses to dole out rewards and punishments will inevitably have a
major effect on the conduct of business in the corporate form.
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So why would the statement be shocking? For starters, in eighteen years of reading
corporate legal scholarship and following public commentary, I have never read
anything to suggest that the government should take an active role in shaping
corporate culture (or even suggesting it could). Perhaps this in itself reflects the
silent power of the ethos of neo-liberalism - in which we have accepted that
corporations, as much as possible, should be free to follow their own ends and
adapt themselves to the demands of the market. Of course, to the extent we believe
in powerful notions of market efficiency, corporate culture would be an extension
or reflection of the market - and there'd be little for government to mold. In the
past twenty five years, of course, there has been greater market competition
affecting corporate firms, as a result of the fall of trade barriers, the technological
innovations described earlier and otherwise. But perhaps even more powerfully,
the end of communism and the fall of the Berlin wall have bequeathed to us a
presumption of "market comprehensiveness." (In a 2001 article, in the wake of the
accounting fraud scandals that market those years, I referred to this ethos as
"market fundamentalism," a term which gained further traction after 200760).
Furthermore, if (as has been accepted), markets exert a high level of pressure on
prices and corporate decision-making, governmental intervention (to shape culture
and otherwise) would be at least wasteful, if not perilous to the firm's viability.
Specialists in anti-trust, both legal scholars and economists, have long
acknowledged that the pressure of market forces operates at different levels of
intensity in different industries and at different times. But corporate legal scholars
have preferred to adhere to the presumption of robust and comprehensive market
pressure in analyzing corporate governance possibilities. The view of market
dynamics described above, the complexity of the notion of "corporate culture," and
its under theorized status in the legal literature explain the novel ring to the idea
that government can and should more actively endeavor to mold a corporate
culture of legal and human rights compliance.
And yet, despite the lack of overt discussion of law's role in shaping corporate
culture, it's apparent that Congress has at various times endeavored to do just this,
for example, in enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. In this Act, Congress
enacted new laws to raise the base line level of corporate transparency (through
various new internal controls and auditing requirements), heightened
executive/managerial accountability for achieving corporate transparency, general
counsel responsibility for alerting the firm to evidence of unlawful conduct,
protection for whistleblowers and other measures designed, individually and in
their totality, to shift corporate culture in the direction of greater conformity with
6 Bombing Markets, Subverting the Rule of Law, Faith Stevelman, Tulane Law Review
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the rule of law. Indeed, this speaks directly to the controversialty of the Act. Many
legal commentators argued that its attendant costs would drive down efficiency and
perhaps even discourage listing in the United States. 61 In the alternative, a few
legal scholars realized that the scope and magnitude of the accounting scandals
signaled that (rather than a "few bad apples" problem) there was a wide ranging
problem in the legal culture which had taken hold atop many seemingly "blue
chip" American corporations. Hence there were a few defenses of Sarbanes Oxley
on the grounds that, though imperfect and incomplete, it was a well-intentioned
legal program to shift corporate culture in the direction of compliance with the law
and democratic norms of transparency and accountability. 62
including recently, has sought promote to effectuate higher standards of legal
compliance, including the avoidance of human rights abuses),the not surprising
then that the 2008 Report's admonition that government and law can go far in
shaping corporate culture - even if they have sought to do just that, for example
through the enactment of Sarbanes Oxley with its emphasis on better internal
controls and greater transparency. 63
Furthermore, although corporate legal scholars have digested much wisdom from
the discipline of economics, they have been less adventurous in exploring the
management and organizational behavior literature (with some notable
exceptions. 64) Even the notion that there is something that is "corporate culture" is
not generally theorized in corporate legal scholarship or corporate governance
writing. After the seemingly endless series of fraudulent accounting scandals from
'01 to '03, scholars became more attuned to the relationship of law and corporate
culture. For example, corporate legal scholars Marlene O'Connor and Lynne
Dallas wrote about law, group psychology and corporate culture (especially as
related to the problem of "group think" and executives' seemingly irrational
assessment of the risk of corporate failure from high level fraud).
61 cite to Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance
6 See e.g. James Fanto, A Social Defense of Sarbanes Oxley, NYLS L Rev 2008?; John C. Coates, "The Goals and
Promise of Sarbanes-Oxley," 91 J. Econ. Persp. (2007).
Add official citation to Sarbanes Oxley, corporate governance provisions (Third part -) see esp 404: certification
of internal controls; ceo cfo disgorgement of bonus compensation where there's a -restatement based on
wrongdoing; increased speed of disclosure of various corporate events and transactions.... rotation of auditing
partner.
" See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended
Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 Geo. L.J. 797-832 (2001).
6s See Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1233, 1264 (2003); Lynne
Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations and Their Directors and Officers for Corporate
Climate: The Psychology of Enron's Demise, 35 Rutgers Law Journal (2003)
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I am sure that almost all corporate legal scholars have a view of the role of
government and law in affecting corporate leadership and firm-level behavior. It's
just that we don't generally acknowledge it as such, a fortiori encourage the
connection between law-making and the formulation of "corporate culture." It just
hasn't been "politically correct" to enunciate the issue in such terms. And yet it
was precisely this question that underlay the debates over what became the Dodd-
Frank legislation. 66 Could financial services firms and banks be allowed to recoup
and redefine (for themselves) the contours of their new approach to firm-level risk-
taking, consumer relations and responsibility to the (international) financial
infrastructure? Or was legal intervention required to mold a new corporate culture
of financial services in the public interest? Apparently, we've just lived through a
transformative moment in which there was a consensus in government, seemingly
vastly supported by the public, that law has a vital role to play in molding
corporate (financial) culture. It's just that the terms of the debate did not play out
in this lexicon of "molding corporate culture."
III. Corporate Law:.The "Who" and "Why" of Human Rights Compliance
A. Who? Of Boards, Committees, Officers and Shareholders
1. Boards and Committees.
For an academic/social theorist, the report's failure to provide any coherent
political or social theory for integrating corporations into the framework of "states
versus individuals" is a notable omission and shortcoming. For a human rights
scholar, the intentional refusal to create a limited set of rights and prioritize them
for business may be the most notable.
But for a corporate governance scholar, on the other hand, the most notable
omission in the 2008 Report is a discussion of where in the corporate organization,
institutionally speaking, the duty/commitment to respect human rights lies. Such
allocation of decision-making authority (among the board, senior officers, various
committees, etc.) is crucial both from a legal and a pragmatic/functional
perspective.
From a formal, legal perspective it's an "absolute". that the board of directors
has plenary governance and decision-making authority over corporate affairs.67
This is reflected in the states' corporation codes, as well as the corporate case law.
As for the latter, this is embodied in the "business judgment rule," where both
Official cite to Dodd-Frank, again
See e.g. Delaware General Corporation Law section 141 "The business and affairs of every corporation shall be
run by or under the discretion of the board of directors." See also NYBCL, Section 701 [the same]
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courts and shareholders are ''removed" from overturning operational decisions
absent some egregious governance breakdown. 8 But applying this touchstone
governance concept (i.e. board plenary authority) to the business and human rights
context, difficult issues surface immediately.
First of all, though boards have plenary authority in corporate affairs, their service
is only part time - a fundamental contradiction of corporate governance that
scholars and theorists have never resolved or even addressed aggressively. Given
the sheer number and complexity of matters that are assigned to board discretion
within the formal model, the American system of governance is fundamentally
contradictory and dysfunctional. And it'.s due to grow worse: worse because the list
of matters that the "ultimate corporate decision-maker" should appropriately
oversee is only growing in scope and complexity, as corporate affairs and the
scope of corporate operations are growing exponentially in scope and complexity.
The tentative, technical solution to the practical problem of "too many
responsibilities, too little time" is to assign precise, delineated functions to
particular subsets (working subcommittees) of the board. In particular, as a matter
of current "best practices," as authorized by statute, corporations constitute specific
committees assigned to executive compensation, board nominations, audit and
financial reporting oversight, shareholder litigation and takeover response, and
other matters presenting any kind of conflict of interest among the corporate actors.
Along these lines, it's easy to imagine an increased prevalence of a "risk
management" board committee whose responsibilities would, inter alia, encompass
avoiding human rights abuses and the negative consumer/employee/investor fallout
-- hence, costs -- which their disclosure occasions. The creation of a board level
"compliance/risk management" committee is probably the best of the alternative
solutions to the issue of where within the corporation to lodge this function.
And yet this solution is problematic in the human rights context because the risk
management committee - presumably a committee composed of directors at the
parent company in the home country -- is likely to be extremely remote
geographically and hence "informationally" from the field of human rights risks.
Perhaps to avoid just this kind of "bureaucratic stacking," of corporations, early
codes of incorporation proscribed corporations from owning stock in other firms.
See e.g. Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, (where the court refused the shareholders' protest against Ford Motor
company's building of a smelter plant); Kamen v. American Express (where the court refused the shareholders
protest that a sale of stock owned by the company would be more advantageous than distributing that stock to the
company shareholders as a dividend); and Shlensky v. Wrigley (where the court refused to compel the company to
alter its policy against night baseball games, despite the revenue which they quite patently would produce). And
more recently, see Citigroup (shareholders' litigation) where the court held that the board's approach to and
oversight of business risk was not susceptible to challenge as a matter of fiduciary duty.
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The hydra-like structure .of parent/holding company atop potentially infinite
subsidiaries and subsidiaries of subsidiaries -- creating compounding layers of
bureaucracy and layers of plausible deniability -- was an organizational
impossibility. In a Jeffersonian tradition, governments were simply loathe.to allow
their commercial "creatures" to grow so powerful, agile and faceless. But the fifty
states let go of this approach of proscriptions and limitations, within corporate law,
as response to the "threat" of excess corporate power and lack of corporate
accountability.
Perhaps most importantly (as described further below), the fiduciary duties which
apply to boards in their oversight of such matters as human rights are profoundly
indeterminate - this would include boards' (and committees') duties of care, good
faith and oversight).69 The most vital "legal force" in influencing boards' and
committees' conduct is not the "letter of the law," but rather the persuasive force of
their lawyers. What the dense web of corporate laws do most significantly, is
ensure that a sensible board (or board committee) will keep its corporate counsel
close at hand and well informed. Following out this idea, the locus of "regulation"
vis a vis governance of this sort, is not the state (as legislature or court), but rather
the moral and rhetorical power of individual corporate lawyers, as backed by their
law firms.
In just this mode, large, ambitious, international corporate law firms and their
cadre of experienced, enterprising corporate lawyers have taken on the "business
and human rights" agenda, in advising boards, committees and devising
compliance plans and codes of conduct, as part of their core competencies.70 In this
tradition, lawyers like Martin Lipton (at Wachtell) 71 and Ira Millstein (at Weill,
Gotshall),72 and law firms like Fried, Frank, and the lawyer/members of the
American Bar Association itself (for example, under the aegis of the Section on
International Law, Corporate Social Responsibility section) have taken on
responsibility for counseling boards on how to respond to, and become proactive
about the growing specter of human rights liability and negative public campaigns
resulting from discovered abuses.
69 William J. Carney & George Shepherd, On the Mystery of Delaware Corporate Law's Continuing Excess... 2005 or
06 or 07.
70 1 believe that the 2009 or 2010 report makes reference to a survey conducted by Fried Frank of lawyers and law
firms and their approach to business and human rights counseling. The rising interest is reflected also, in the ABA's
recent creation of a "Committee on Corporate Social Responsibility," as part of the International Law Section.
71 Wachtell Lipton put out a memo on the 2008 Report, which was cautionary if not critical of the increasing
pressure being brought to bear on boards and firms in general.
72 Ira Millstein, of Weill, Gotshall, also put out a client memorandum; he was less critical of the PRR framework and
its import for corporate governance.
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This proactive, precautionary message aimed at boards and client firms (by elite
corporate counselors and their firms) is progress as a matter of institutional design.
But there's room for. concern as well. This same cadre of distinguished, effective
advocates will reconstitute themselves as defense counsel should there be any real
specter of liability/"complicity" on the part of the corporation in the human rights
area.
2. Officers: Chief Compliance Officer, Chief Operating Officer, General Counsel
The most obvious institutional site for a "human rights abuse avoidance" program
would be within the office of the Chief Compliance Officer. Over the past decade
the legal compliance function, as a corporate office distinct from, say, the legal
department, has grown exponentially. At bottom, creating a plan of compliance,
enunciating the standards for avoiding noncompliance and its importance,
disseminating the compliance agenda and instructions and monitoring the firm's
agents' and employees' adherence thereto is a coherent corporate function, most
likely, independent of the precise substantive area of concern. 73 This augurs for
locating this function within a compliance department and assigning oversight to a
chief compliance officer. The problem with this approach, as Ruggie's 2008 report
implies, is that its unintended effect is likely to diminish the importance and
potentially even the actual, on the ground likelihood of compliance, on account of
this phenomenon of institutional segregation/ghetto-ization. A check-the-box
approach to human rights abuse avoidance is likely to work the best when the
situation on the ground is stable and the likelihood of important abuses are low -
which is to say when it matters the least. Furthermore, there is a burgeoning
literature on corporate compliance which suggests that achieving the desired result
is far more complicated than it would initially appear, and is described in the 2008
Report in terms of "due diligence" and avoidance of "complicity."7 4
What about elevating the task of "eliciting" rights abuse avoidance to the office of
the chief operating officer ("COO"), even, potentially, the chief operating officer at
subsidiaries in host countries? This turns the aforesaid problems on their head.
7 This corporate function gained increased salience as a result of the federal sentencing guidelines pertaining to
corporations. The guidelines expressly endorsed a more "forgiving" approach where corporations. had adopted
reasonable compliance programs and endeavored in good faith to implement them on a firm wide level. For
commentary see e.g. Diana E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A Decade of
Promoting Compliance and Ethics, 87 Iowa L. Rev. 697 (2002) (discussing the positive effects of the corporate
compliance programs induced by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
74 See e.g. Gabel, Mansfield & Houghton, Letter vs. Spirit: The Evolution of Compliance into Ethics, 46 Am. Bus. L.J.
453 (2009); Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. Rev 949 (2009); James Fanto,
Recognizing the "Bad Barrel" in Public Business Firms: Social and Organizational Factors in Misconduct by Senior
Decision-Makers, 57 Buffalo L. Rev. 1 (2009); Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Criminal Liability: When Does it Make
Sense? 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1437 (2009).
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Chief Operating Officers are likely to be able to anticipate where there would be
problems, and respond either ex ante to prevent them or ex post to limit the
damage or provide some immediate remediation. Of course, this is especially true
if the job goes to the COO at a foreign subsidiary, in regions where there is
relatively weak rule of law or relatively high risk of conflict. The problem is that
the COO's duties are already so broad, and in essence, keyed into keeping the
overall operations "on the rails," so to speak, that avoiding human rights abuses is
just not likely to achieve sufficient salience as part of the COO's responsibilities.
The scope of duties falling to a COO in a public company (and even a foreign
subsidiary of a public company) is likely to be so broad - and so oriented towards
profit-making -- that abuse avoidance won't be a priority. Enhanced global market
competition is part of the conundrum of achieving greater global adherence to base
line norms of human rights compliance. More of the former may not directly lead
to more of the latter, but if competition is sufficiently fierce, it may drain
organizational resources away from truly important but not "essential" functions
like achieving better corporate citizenship.
That leaves the office of the general counsel - what is the role of the office of the
general counsel in human rights abuse avoidance and remediation? On this issue,
interestingly, the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 becomes relevant, in two ways.
First, the Act puts a premium on the construction of robust and comprehensive
systems of internal controls for corporations. As part of this push, the Act requires
chief executive officers to certify the integrity - the reasonable sophistication and
efficacy -- of the corporation's internal controls systems." This is the flip side of
the advances in communications and information technology described above. Put
simply, as firms have acquired the technical capability of tracking their conduct
more comprehensively, they have gradually been held to a higher standard for
being aware of and responsible for their conduct. And Sarbanes Oxley connects the
internal controls function to the institutional role of the general counsel.
This is true because the Act, in Section 307, mandates that where the general
counsel becomes aware of "evidence of unlawful conduct" he or she must respond
and report "up the ladder," and even to the board of directors if necessary.7 The
general counsel must drive the evidence to the upper echelon of the corporation,
until he or she is satisfied that there will be an appropriate response. This up the
ladder, bright line, federal legal reporting duty prescribed for inside counsel is an
enormously promising development for advancing business compliance with
7s Add official citation to Section 404 of Sarbanes Oxley. And see also Houman Shadab, Innovation and Corporate
Governance: The impact of Sarbanes-Oxley, 10 U. Pa. J. Bus. & Emp. L. 955 (2008).
76 Add official citation to SOX section 307.
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human rights. Although there is controversy of what the operational standard of
"evidence of unlawful corporate conduct" is, there's no doubt that a wise general
counsel would not volunteer to be the scapegoat for unlawful corporate activity by
"sitting on" disturbing information and facilitating under-reporting.
Furthermore, and of crucial importance, once the information about a potential
human rights problem is reported to the senior-most corporate officers and/or
directors, the scope for "plausible deniability" is lessened radically. The scope for
either liability or public opprobrium would accordingly expand.
B. The. Corporate Law Duty of Oversight and Directors' Accountability for
Human Rights Abuse Avoidance?
As discussed earlier, the Ruggie PRR framework barely addresses the conceptual
underpinnings of corporations' duty to respect human rights. Ironically, corporate
fiduciary law (in tandem with expanding SEC disclosure requirements) may hold
some answers to why corporations have a duty to respect human rights (by
avoiding complicity in human rights abuses). Here we turn to the question of
boards' and officers' fiduciary duties to establish internal systems of information
gathering and reporting systems, oversee their operations in good faith, and employ
the information acquired to promote legal compliance. This obligation is referred
to in corporate fiduciary law under a number of rubrics: as a duty of oversight, a
duty of care and a duty of good faith (in avoiding unlawful corporate conduct).77 In
any event, in each of these versions of the fiduciary duty, the directors would have
an obligation to be observant about corporate human rights risks in implementing
information gathering and reporting systems, and to take decisive action if they
become cognizant of corporate complicity.
Again, the heart of the PRR framework for is for companies (their officers, lawyers
and boards) to become more aware of the danger of corporate complicity in human
rights abuses, more vigilant about avoiding them. As for the law, in the aftermath
of a landmark 1996 decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery, In re Caremark,
it has been widely accepted that boards have a duty to implement and oversee
efficacious systems of information gathering and reporting. This duty of oversight
relates not only to the production of accurate financial information, but also to the
gathering of information relevant to compliance with laws and corporate policies
quite generally. 8 (Indeed, in Caremark the issue was (non)compliance with health
care regulations, rather than financial accounting fraud.) This explicit, board-level,
n For a thorough and thoughtful survey of the field and the contemporary case law see Eric J. Pan, A Board's Duty
to Monitor, 54 N.Y.L.S.L. Rev. 717 (2009/10).
78 In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959.(Del. Ch. 1996).
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legal duty of oversight arose belatedly in corporate law -- after the internal controls
framework had already been well established in auditing and securities.
regulations.7 9 And though there is ongoing argumentation over what circumstances
would mandate board or individual director liability for oversight and compliance
failures,80 there really is no longer any dispute about whether the board has
acquired a legal obligation of overseeing the integrity of the systems supporting
corporate legal compliance (and its "sister," good corporate citizenship).
This duty of oversight is sufficiently new in corporate law, and sufficiently crucial
to the "corporate respect for rights" project that it warrants further detailed
examination herein. Again, the landmark case in corporate law was written in 1996
by Chancellor Allen of the Delaware Chancery Court. In his opinion in In re
Caremark, Allen provided a new reading of the "duty -of care," so that it
encompassed, for the board, an ongoing duty to establish and oversee internal
controls systems which would gather, synthesize and report vital information up
the ladder -- presumably to the company's internal auditors, financial officers,
general counsel and compliance team, operating officers, CEO and ultimately the
board itself. The Caremark opinion is unflinching in endorsing this facet of
institutional design and assigning it, as a new fiduciary responsibility, to the
highest corporate office (the board). The opinion, furthermore, is sweeping in
describing the scope and purpose of such corporate information gathering and
reporting systems: they are crucial to ensure the accuracy of mandated public
reporting; and crucial to promoting corporate legal compliance as a general matter.
Importantly, there are distinct echoes of the Caremark language in the 2008 Ruggie
report. For example, where the Report refers to the importance of ensuring the
widespread distribution of compliance programs throughout the enterprise, as a
facet of managing and reducing the potential for corporate criminal liability.81 This
"Caremark oversight and compliance" duty remained controversial - in part
because the Court of Chancery is not the highest court in Delaware, and in part
because the opinion was in many respects "advisory" in nature (written in the
context of approving a settlement of a shareholder action.) But in 2006, in Stone v.
Ritter, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed these "Caremark duties" on the part
of corporate directors, as a facet of their duty of good faith. This augurs for
For an excellent account of the history of the internal controls notion, prior to its acceptance into the corporate
fiduciary canon, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and Internal Control, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 237, 244-
50 (1997); and see also,
80 See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
81 In Caremark this appears in the discussion of boards' duties to adopt compliance programs, consistent with
reducing the foreseeable scope of corporate criminal liability, consistent with the federal sentencing guidelines.
Caremark at
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improved internal reporting of the firm's record in the human rights area, and
heightened attention to avoiding trap of legal complicity in human rights abuse.
On the other hand, things are never this simple in corporate fiduciary law, and they
are certainly not simple in the area of corporate and director responsibility for
human rights compliance. Most germanely, there is a persistent schism between
"standards of conduct" and "standards of liability" in corporate law.82 For this
reason, the clear legal mandate for improved information gathering and reporting
and improved corporate legal compliance, as a facet of the board's responsibility,
is not backed by a forceful threat of board liability -- at least not within corporate
fiduciary law. For example, the Delaware courts have resolved to find a breach of
good faith warranting personal liability only where the plaintiff has demonstrated
intentional bad faith - that is, willful indifference to corporate legal compliance. 83
And so the "take away" from this fiduciary development is mixed. And, again, the
result--'the message to the firm and the board about the duty of oversight and
enhanced legal compliance responsibilities -- is highly contingent on the
interpretation of the law by the individual corporate counselor advising the board
and the business. From the vantage point of standards of conduct, there is
movement in the right direction, at least; and the threat of very damaging publicity
and even shame (where truly bad acts are aired) may be sufficient to fill the void of
real liability risk.
But there is an additional caveat to the scope and force of directors' duty of
oversight. The duty has recently been truncated in claims arising from the global
financial crisis. The Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed a board "failure to
monitor" claim which did not relate to corporate legal violations. Most
prominently, in a derivative suits against the board of Citigroup, the shareholders
alleged that the directors were grossly uninformed about the actual risks attendant
to the firm's enormous stockpile of subprime mortgage assets and assumption of
extraordinarily high amounts of leverage (which led to the firms' insolvency and
need for a government bailout). Because the shareholders could not demonstrate
the board's (or any individual director's) awareness of a legal violation, the
shareholders' duty of oversight claims were dismissed under the "business
judgment rule" (which holds that operational matters, even if they go horribly
awry, cannot be challenged by shareholders under fiduciary law or otherwise).84
This result raises the question of whether shareholders could sue the board for
82 For the landmark treatment of the subject see Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and
Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 437,.439-49 (1993).
See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005); Brehm v. Eisner, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006);
McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262, 1273-74 (Del. Ch. 2008).
In re Citigroup Inc. S'holders Derivative Litig., 964 A2d. 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
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oversight failures vis a vis human rights abuses, if they could not establish a
predicate of actual legal violations on the company's part. Indeed, that is the most
likely legal interpretation of the extant case law. Personal financial liability for the
board, on account of human rights abuse by the firm, is an extraordinarily remote
legal possibility.
Moreover, even if the hurdle of legal violations of human rights were established
on the corporation's part, there is the matter of proving "scienter," as a predicate to
success in holding a director personally liable on an oversight/breach of good faith
claim. Up the ladder reporting obligations on the general counsel's part and
functioning internal controls systems can only go so far. Even where the factual
information travels up to the board, it may be insufficient to allow the plaintiffs' to
meet the extraordinarily high bar of showing the board's "willful" and deliberate
indifference to corporate human rights (legal) violations. The Delaware Court of
Chancery's recent dismissal of a derivative suit against the board of Dow Chemical
alleging oversight failure vis a vis proven corporate bribery (involving a joint
venture in Kuwait) demonstrates the hiP bar to establishing actionable oversight
failure or bad faith on the board's part.8 Hence the fiduciary duty of oversight and
duty of good faith add little to rights advocates' storehouse of actionable legal
remedies - at least in the matter of genuine civil liability. The existence of these
board fiduciary duties is not irrelevant. They provide a clear mandate for greater
board attentiveness and improved compliance programs and systems of
information gathering about human rights compliance by the company - as
described in the 2008 Report. But to the extent they obtain growing force, as duties
and corporate commitments, it will not obtain force through the leverage of
genuine director liability risk.
IV. U.S. Securities Law and Human Rights Concerns
Securities law has a fundamentally different focus from corporate law, of course,
and may - ironically -- be ahead of corporate law in promoting corporate human
rights conscientiousness by business.
as Again, this is the standard that is established in Brehm v. Eisner, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
86 In Re The Dow Chemical Company Derivative Litigation, Cons. No. 4339, (Del. Ch., Jan. 11, 2010), The ruling from
Delaware Chancellor William B. Chandler Ill dismissed each claim, stating the plaintiffs did not provide enough
evidence to support their claims. The lawsuit, filed by shareholders of The Dow Chemical Co., alleged that board
members breached their duties during the company's purchase of Rohm and Haas Co. In the lawsuit, plaintiffs
Michael D. Blum and Norman R. Meier claimed Dow's board breached its financial duties by approving the deal,
misrepresented how a failed joint venture in Kuwait would affect the purchase of Rohm and Haas and failed to
prevent alleged bribery, misrepresentation, insider trading and wasteful compensation. Chandler found that the
"(p)laintiffs have failed to plead particularized facts sufficient to establish a substantial likelihood of liability for any
Dow director, let alone a majority of the board, on the grounds of bribery, misrepresentations, insider trading,
excessive or wasteful compensation or any other ground."
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The guiding principle in securities law has always been: "What information is
important to reasonable investors - and .how should federal law encourage such
corporate disclosure and intra-shareholder communications?" This orientation
would seem entirely compatible with a corporate reporting and shareholder
proposal system encompassing not only financial and commercial corporate
information, but also information shedding light on the negative externalities
produced by corporate operations. In this latter vein, both Louis Brandeis8 7 and
Adolfe A. Berle Jr. were interested in the development of corporate and securities
laws, including disclosure laws, serving the social interest, broadly construed.
Though Berle's landmark "The Modem Corporation and Private Property," is most
commonly read as a treatise on the agency costs arising from separating corporate
ownership from control, the volume's themes are far broader in actuality.8 8 Indeed,
Berle devotes substantial attention to the problem of vast, bureaucratic, public
companies accruing social and political power unaccountable to anyone beyond the
elite, insulated group of professional managers atop the firm.89 His articulated fear
was that they might wield such immense organizational resources selfishly, and
contrary to the public interest.
Nevertheless, for most of the 20th century, the more crimped view of investors'
interests shaped and limited the disclosure and shareholder proposal systems
overseen by the SEC. And yet, as described more fully below, there are several
signs of change - both at the Congressional and SEC level.
A. Social Disclosure and the New Dodd-Frank Provisions
Over the last fifteen or so years, especially as a result of sustained and mounting
pressure by socially conscientious mutual funds and public pension funds, an
altered dynamic is emerging in the contours of mandatory public company
reporting under the oversight of the SEC. As a result of various commissioned
studies, the scope of the subjects that Congress and the SEC now assume falls
within the interest of a reasonable investors has broadened considerably. 90 The
strictures of the mandatory reporting system are being enlarged to require
8 Louis D. Brandeis, Other People's Money and How the Banker's Use It (August M. Kelley, 1986, Originally
published 1914), at 92 ("publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases."). The o
For recent commentary on the landmark volume see Symposium, Seattle University School of Law, Volume
(arising from meeting in November 2009)..
Reference to The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 1932 [I can find the pages]
9oSee Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ... provisions calling for disclosure of gap
between senior-most executive compensation pay and the average worker's pay. And see also, Amendments to
Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 34-40018 (May 21, 1998), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-40018.htm. Therein the SEC stated: "We have gained a better understanding of
the depth of interest among shareholders in having an opportunity to express their views to company
management on employment-related proposals that raise sufficiently significant policy issues.). Id
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additional reporting of corporations' environmental compliance, labor standards,
executive * compensation rates, anti-corruption - efforts and anti-discrimination
policies. Shareholders have become more attuned to the fact substantial white
collar criminal penalties attach to malfeasance in many of these areas, as well as
civil fines, embarrassing enforcement actions and negative publicity campaigns.
Moreover, as large institutional investors, and especially pension funds, play an
increasingly salient role in the securities markets, the investing public's concerns
increasingly mirror those of the broader citizenry. The costs of social degradation
are costs to investors too.
The recent Dodd-Frank Legislation ("Dodd Frank"91) includes three new socially-
significant disclosure mandates. The first, in Section 1504, requires U.S. listed,
internationally active extractive enterprises to disclose payments to foreign
governments for resource rights, including the extraction of oil, natural gas and
other mineral rights.92 The new law gives the .SEC roughly nine months to
promulgate final regulations to require such resource extraction issuers (and/or
their subsidiaries or controlling companies) to make disclosure in their annual
reports of any payments made to foreign governments (or to the federal
government) for commercial development of oil, natural gas or minerals. In
formulating the precise features of this disclosure mandate, the SEC is directed to
take account of the features and guidelines extant in the well established (but
merely voluntary) disclosure mandates incorporated into the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative. Such disclosures will be beneficial to investors, as they
will protect companies from false publicity asserting below-market, "collusive"
contracts between the company and corrupt governments for the resources (and,
accordingly, minimize the potential for asset seizures). And the disclosures will
also benefit indigenous populations by facilitating the work of nongovernmental
organizations devoted to tracking whether the proceeds from resources sales and
contracts feed back into civic projects, consistent with the rights of the citizens of
such countries.
In a similar vein, Section 1502 of Dodd-Frank requires the SEC to engage in rule-
making addressing public companies (or subsidiaries or controlling entities of such
companies) whose products make use of certain "conflict" minerals originating in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo or adjoining countries. The impetus for the
SEC's rule-making is a conviction that companies whose manufacturing employs
91 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub.L. 111-203, H.R. 4173
92 In the interests of full disclosure: I testified before the House Financial Services Committee in favor of passage of
the bill. My testimony appears as an Appendix in Stevelman, Globalization and Corporate Social Responsibility:
Challenges for the Academy, Future Lawyers and Corporate Law, 53, NYLS L Rev 817 (Appendix A, 853-858)
(2009/10).
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minerals obtained from such areas must exercise due diligence on the "source and
chain of custody of such minerals." Congress has specifically mandated that the
report provide evidence of an independent private sector audit demonstrating the
company's efforts to ensure that the minerals were obtained absent corporate
complicity in indigenous conflicts and violence. Under the Act, the SEC has until
April 17, 2011 to promulgate rules requiring annual reports to the SEC by such
firms, as well as their making such information available to the public on their
company's website. This provision, quite patently, is a step forward in Congress'
effort to promote human rights observance by U.S. firms and their affiliates.
Finally, after several recent high profile coal mining disasters, in Section 1503 of
the Act, Congress has endorsed greater disclosure, in each periodic report filed
with the SEC, of mining companies' (and their subsidiaries') health and safety
records, including the total number of any mining-related fatalities at the
enterprise. The new disclosure requirements, which went into effect already, on
August 20, 2010, should also vastly increase the leverage of the Mine Safety and
Health Administration ("MSHA"). They require comprehensive disclosure of the
MSHA's issuance of notices of violations (of health and safety standards),
imminent danger orders and the total value of financial fines ("assessments") it has-
levied for violations. The Section is largely self-effectuating -- i.e. it does not
depend on subsequent SEC rule-making in order to become effective. 93 Evidencing
some alarm at the deviation from the narrowest definition of investors'
"reasonable" concerns, one well known, traditional corporate law firm noted (in a
client advisory) that the mining health and safety record disclosure are "unbounded
by traditional concepts of materiality." 94
This article takes a favorable view of the expansion of mandatory SEC reporting so
as to encompass areas where public companies' operations risk implicating the
firm in human rights abuses or otherwise producing substantial negative social
externalities. Yet there's no doubt that Congress' and the SEC's new embrace of
"social disclosure" is not complete and, for some, still controversial. One corporate
law firm went so far as to describe the Dodd-Frank Act's new disclosure mandates
as "an unfortunate use of the federal securities laws for purposes unrelated to
securities transactions and disclosures."9 Perhaps for some corporate law firms
and general counsel, the old view of securities investors as being reified, merely
two-dimensional beings interested exclusively in garnering immediate financial
profits is not entirely dead. But at the same time it's also. true that more and more
See circa 5. U.S.C. Section 553 (b).
See p. 3 Covington & Burley, LLP "Advisory/Dodd-Frank Act: New Disclosure Rules Relating to Extractive
Industries," July 22, 2010 [from the web
9s Id at 4.
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companies are perceiving the employee, customer and investor morale benefits of
publishing corporate social responsibility reports, and the International Standards
Organization (ISO) is working on an increasingly robust set of standards for
quantifying corporate performance in the human rights and social responsibility
areas. In sum, it's a transitional moment in the development of standards of
transparency, accountability and human rights compliance for publicly listed
United States firms; but the trend is solidly in the direction of greater disclosure
and greater accountability.
B. Social Action Shareholder Proposals in the Company Proxy
Shareholder proposals to be included in the corporate proxy statement are the most
established, consistent channel for shareholder social activism (or "corporate social
responsibility") in the United States. 96 This reflects Congress' mandate to the
Commission which specifically empowered it to consider "the public interest," as
well as the matter of investor protection, per se, when crafting the rules to govern
shareholders' communications with management and one another. In its earliest
incarnation, in 1942, the SEC's shareholder proposal rule reflected the desire to
render the corporate proxy statement materially complete as to the matters which
were expected to be presented, in person, at the annual shareholders' meeting. This
was especially pressing because the proxies (votes, essentially) would be
returned/cast prior to the live meeting. Hence, were the proposals not so included,
the shareholder body would not be informed of them, and the rule provided for
inclusion of any shareholder proposal which "constituted a proper subject for
shareholder action."9 Of course, circulation of an independent proxy statement by
the shareholder-proponent would be prohibitively costly.
It was in the 1970's that social action shareholder proposals truly took off. Indeed,
after a famous ruling by the D.C. District Court in Medical Committee for Human
Rights v. S.E.C.,98 in 1976, the SEC altered the shareholder proposal rule to
provide, expressly, that matters which raised substantial social policy issues could
not be excluded from the corporate proxy even if they addressed some facet of
fundamental corporate operations - i.e. something traditionally within the purview
96
For a brief account of the legal history of corporate social responsibility within the American system of corporate
governance, see Faith Stevelman, Globalization and Corporate Social Responsibility, NYLS L Rev (2009) at 823 -
827.
9 SEC Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 3638, 1945 SEC LEXIS 233 1 (Jan. 3, 1945).
98 432 F.2d 659 (D.C.Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972). For commentary on the development of
shareholder proxy activism through this twenty year period see Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A
Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 Ala. L. Rev. 879 (1993).
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of the board and not the shareholders.99 In this same early period, Reverend Leon
Sullivan used the publicity arising from his submission of shareholder proposals to
General Motors to persuade the company to accelerate its progress towards racial
and gender diversity in its management ranks.' 00
And Dr. Sullivan went on, through further proxy activism to spur the campaign for
divestment from apartheid era South Africa.10 Social action shareholder proposals
have flourished ever since. Many shareholder proposals dealing with firms'
environmental and workers' safety records, labor practices, political activities,
executive compensation policies and approach to equality and anti-discrimination
efforts have been included in corporate proxies. Even where they have not
garnered a majority of shareholder votes, they have often proven "successful"
when measured by the publicity and leverage to catalyze change which they have
generated. Many times, the proponents are able, even, to drop their campaign to
have the proposal included, because the companies, proactively, voluntarily
conform their conduct to the objective described in the shareholder proposal.
There are an increasing number of shareholder proposals which expressly raise the
issue of business and human rights, or raise issues which are encompassed as part
of a business and human rights agenda.. For example, a group called "Investors
Against Genocide" has employed the shareholder proposal process to persuade
TIAA-CREF and American Funds to commit to avoiding investment in firms
Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 12,999, 41 Fed.
Reg. 52,994, 52,998 (Nov. 22 1976).
100 For commentary see See Donald E. Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM,
69 MICH. L. REV. 419 (1971).
101 The connection between Dr. Sullivan's obtaining a presence on GM's board and the genesis of the "Sullivan
Proposals" is described in a recent letter to the SEC from the Inter faith Center on Corporate Responsibility
("ICCR"), which has been perhaps the most active proponent of shareholder social activism through the proxy. See
Letter to the SEC from Paul M. Neuhauser, on behalf of the ICCR, in favor of the adoption of amendments to the
SEC's rules to facilitate shareholder director NnminationsReleases 33-9046, 34-60089, IC 28765; File No. S7-10-09
(June 10, 2009) dated August 17, 2009 As described therein: " In 1971 the Episcopal Church introduced a
shareholder proposal at General Motors requesting that registrant to cease operations in South Africa, a nation
then enforcing a very separation by race in the workplace (jobs, pay, drinking fountains etc). The registrant's proxy
statement revealed that one of GM's directors, the Rev Leon Sullivan, had voted against the Board's decision to
oppose the shareholder proposal. At the annual meeting Rev. Sullivan came down from the dais and spoke in favor
of the shareholder proposal. The upshot of the "conflict" on GM's Board was the creation, by a coalition led by
General Motors but consisting of almost all of the major US corporations operating in South Africa, of the "Sullivan
Principles", a code of conduct to abolish apartheid in their South African workplaces. Thus, the need for GM's
Board to adopt a modus vivendi between the conflicting views on the Board brought real progress not only at GM,
but at virtually all American companies operating in South Africa." For further commentary on the shareholder
proposal system as a vehicle for enhanced social transparency and social accountability on behalf of public
companies, see Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112
Harv. L. Rev. 1197 (1999).
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which are implicated in the genocide in Darfur.102 Inverstors Against Genocide is
presently campaigning to expand this "disinvestment" campaign to virtually all of
the major American mutual fund companies and major financial institutions. In this
same vein, Fidelity was informed by the SEC that it could not omit a shareholder
proposal proposing a ban on investment in corporations doing business in Sudan. 103
Shareholder proposals seeking to raise corporate awareness of labor abuses
occuring along the company's supply chain have been presented to corporations
including Gap, Mattel, Sears, Walt Disney Co., McDonalds and Costco.104 These
shareholder proposals have encouraged the companies to adopt the core
conventions of the International Labor Organization in ensuring against forced
labor and especially child labor. In addition, through the use of shareholder
proposals, companies in the mining sector have been made to feel increased
pressure to raise their standards of safety and environmental compliance. Indeed,
even the submission of the proposals is sometimes sufficient to improve the
company's social responsiveness. In 2006, for example, roughly one third of the
social action proposals submitted were voluntarily withdrawn prior to the
circulation of the proxy statement because the shareholder advocates had reached a
voluntary resolution of their concerns in consulation with the company's
management.105 In this same vein, in 2008, several ethically motivated investor
groups agreed to drop their formal proxy proposal when Canadian mining firm
Goldcorp, Inc. agreed to conduct a study of its Human Rights record in
Guatemala.106
Finally, shareholder proposals have been used to demand greater transparency and
accountability about corporations' political (and purportedly philanthropic)
activities -- including politically motivated donations to think tanks and
foundations associated with politicians.'07 Disclosure arising from traditional
102102 See Investors Against Genocide at http://investorsagainstgenocide.net/aboutus.
103 2008 SEC No-Act LEXIS 31 (January 22, 2008).
104 See e.g. Re: Costco Wholesale Corporation, 2004 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 806 (October 26, 2004); The Gap Inc., 2002
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 385, *40 (March 13, 2002). For citation and discussion see Adam Kanzer, "The Use of
Shareholder Proposals to Address Corporate Human Rights Performance, Chapter 5, FINANCE FOR A BETTER
WORLD (Macmillan, 2009).
105 Carolyn Mathiasen and Heidi Welsh, "Social Policy Shareholder Resolutions in 2006: Issues, Votes and Views of
Institutional Investors (Published by the Social Issues Service, ISS, March 2007).
106 For citation to the study completed by Goldcorp. see http://hria-quatemaa.com; For a brief summary of
Ethical Funds' accord with Goldcorp which led to the study see
https://www.ethicalfunds.com/en/Investor/OurStorylInTheNews/EthicalFundsintheNews/Pages/17052010e.aspx
107 Such shareholder proposals can be excluded from the corporate proxy for a variety or reasons,
including: (i) where they are deemed not to be a subject for shareholder but rather for board decision-
making;. (ii) where they are vague (iii) where they reflect a "personal grievance" on the part of the
proponent, inter alia. See Rule 14a-8 (Question 9). And see also, See e.g. Halliburton 2010 SEC No-Act
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campaign finance and lobbying laws is deficient in .providing an adequately clear
and comprehensive account of such corporate activities. For this reason, activist
shareholders have resorted to asking companies directly to account for their
donations and gifts. 08 Shareholder proposals in the area of corporate political
activity and transparency are particularly important in the wake of the Supreme
Court's Citizens United decision, which expanded corporations' power to expend
funds in a variety of political contests.109 The push for greater transparency in
regard to businesses' lobbying and campaign finance expenditures is part of the
broader concern for advancing the rule of law and democratic values - both being
essential facets of the human rights agenda.
C. The Anti-Bribery Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act
As described above, the PRR framework enumerates a comprehensive set of
human rights but declines to single out or prioritize among rights that corporations
might impinge upon. Nevertheless, it's apparent that corporate bribery and other
forms of unlawful dealings between businesses and foreign governments are
contrary to fundamental tenets of human rights. Furthermore, consistent with this
viewpoint, the United Kingdom has just enacted the toughest of modern anti-
corporate bribery laws"t0 - laws which are far more stringent than their American
counterpart, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act."
LEXIS 82 (Jan. 21, 2010) ( concluding that company had no proper basis to exclude request for disclosure
of company's political contributions); Pacific Gas & Electric, 2010 SEC NO. Act LEXIS 239 (Allowing
company to exclude proposal requesting semi-annual report of company's charitable contributions and
policies governing them on basis that request was "substantially implemented" by the company);
Caremark Rx 2005 SEC No-Act LEXIS 352 (refusing to concur with the corporations reasons for exlcluding
request for report on company's charitable c ontributions).
10s For a discussion of the disclosure void relevant to politically motivated corporate "philanthropic" donations to
politically active foundations, think tanks and litigation boutiques, see Nancy Knauer, Reinventing Government: the
Promise of Institutional Choice and Government Created Charitable Organizations, 41 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL
LAW REVIEW 945 (1997) Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora's Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of
Corporate Philanthropy, _ UCLA L. Rev. _ (1997). And on the use-of seemingly philanthropic "conduits" to mask
corporate political activities see Nancy Knauer
109 Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 50 (2010),110 On April 8, 2010, the U.K. Parliament passed significant and long-pending legislation reforming Britain's laws on
criminalizing corrupt payments to government officials. Expected to come into full force this autumn, the Bribery
Act of 2010 replaces fragmented and difficult-to-prosecute, common law bribery offenses and statutory offenses
that date back to the early 1900s. The reform coincides with significantly increased enforcement efforts by the U.K.
Serious Fraud Office and responds to international criticisms that U.K. legislation lagged behind OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention implementation legislation and the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. For an overview of the new
U.K. law see Gary DiBianco & Penny Madden, "U.K. Parliament Enacts Landmark Anti-Bribery Law" Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, April 15, 2010 available at
ill § 78dd-1 [Section 30A of the Securities & Exchange Act of 1934].
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The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") was enacted in 1977 after a series of
scandals involving American companies paying bribes to foreign governments to
win contracts abroad.1 12 The FCPA was enacted into the Securities Act of 1934,
along with a more stringent "accurate books and records" provision for public
corporations. 113 The idea, clearly, was that if companies were making. such
unlawful payments, they would not be accounting and reporting them consistent
with the disclosure requirements mandated by the securities laws, including
accounting under generally accepted accounting principles. This is an early
example of how disclosure enacted in the interest of investors quite obviously was
intended to encompass broader public social welfare objectives.
Over the past five years, there has been an increasing intensification in the number
and seriousness of FCPA enforcement actions brought by the SEC (in civil cases)
and the Department of Justice (for alleged criminal violations of the FCPA).
Indeed enforcement over the past five years has set several new records.114 For
example, in April 2010, the DOJ announced that the German automobile
manufacturer Daimler, A.G. agreed to pay $185 million in criminal and civil
penalties in settlement to resolve FCPA charges.' 15 Also in April of this year, a
Virginia federal court sentenced an american who paid bribes to the Panamanian
government in order to facilitate a twenty year, no bid contract for "Ports
Engineering Consultants Corp., to over seven years in jail."'6 This enhanced
scrutiny and enforcement is motivated not only by anti-corruption, and anti-money
laundering concerns, but also, perhaps ironically, by provisions of the USA
Patriot's Act which target eradicating the flow of funds to governments which
potentially support terrorist organizations.1 17  The stepped up anti-bribery
legislation enacted by the United Kingdom was mentioned above. This renewed
112 For a landmark case (decided after the enactment of the FCPA) which allowed a special litigation committee to
quash a shareholder derivative suit against a board of directors and senior officers where the company had
engaged in pattern of making unlawful payments to foreign governments, prior to the enactment of the FCPA, see
Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 NY2d 619 (1979).
113 U.S.C.; TITLE 15; CHAPTER 2B-SECURITIES EXCHANGES; § 78m. Periodical and other reports; (a) Reports by
issuer of security; contents.
114 See Lanny A. Breur, Asst Atty' Gen. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Prepared Address to the 22nd National Forum on the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 17, 2009), at *1 http://www.justice.gov./criminal/pr/speeches-
testimoney/documents/11-17-09aagbreuer-remarks-fcpa.pdf.
11sust1s As part of the settlement, former FBI Director Louis Freeh will serve as the company's independent
compliance monitor for three years. For announcement see the FCPA blog:
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2010/3/25/freeh-named-daimler-monitor.html
116 The official announcement of the verdict and findings is presented by the DOJ at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/April/10-crm-442.html
117 Provide official citation to US Patriot's Act.
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commitment is evidenced in many European Union, United Nations and
International Treaties as well.' 18
Clearly, there is a broad and deep consensus that a strong stand against business-
facilitated corruption is essential to building a strong, law-abiding, human rights
respecting international order.
Conclusion
There are powerful reasons to be skeptical and cynical about efforts to raise the
level of business compliance with human rights - that is to use law, policy, and
public pressure to transform corporate cultures to rights respecting ones, rather
than rights-exploiting ones. There is no embarrassment in expecting the worst and
being proven correct, or being passive in the face of complex problems.
Businesses' efforts to promote respect for human rights may be lambasted as
public relations, or as ineffectual, or simply inefficient. Governments' efforts may
be criticized on the same basis. However, when pressure mounts at various fronts,
simultaneously and with increasing force -- from leaders in many governments,
leaders in nongovernmental organizations, activists from employee and labor
groups, investor groups, citizens' and students' groups - pressure to hold
businesses which profit from global operations to account for their treatment of
vulnerable populations and scarce natural resources, attention should be paid.
Change happens, momentous, transformational change - like the end of
segregation in the United States, the end of Apartheid in South Africa, the fall of
the Berlin .Wall. None of these changes seemed inevitable. In this same vein, as
John Ruggie's reports caution, gaps in global governance regimes are making it too
easy for multinational corporations to exploit regulatory vacuums to do harm. Yet
these harms will not stay invisible on account of the technological innovations
which facilitate information gathering and real time reporting on the web. The
Human Rights Council has done well in authorizing John Ruggie to sponsor
several years of international consultations with leaders in governments, business
and in the human rights community. If they follow the "Protect, Respect, Remedy"
framework with seriousness of purpose, businesses may be able to get out in front
of the tumultuous change their abuses might otherwise spur. Then instead of
us See e.g. The European Union's Convention on the Protection of European Communities' Financial Interests, the
Organization of American States' Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development's Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business
Transactions, the United Nations' Convention Against Corruption; the African Union's Convention on Preventing
and Combatting Corruption, as well as policies instituted by the World Bank and the IMF allowing for the
investigation of corruption committeed by companies and governments. For commentary and statistics, see
Shearman & Sterling, LLP, Recent Trends and Patterns of FCPA Enforcement (as of February 13, 2008).
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violent transformation and anti-business regulation, we might see gradual,
international progress towards a more humane and also more prosperous world
where business and human rights concerns are not always viewed as
fundamentally at odds.
41

